Noûs 43 (3):490-512 (2009)
Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.
|Keywords||Reasons ontology metaepistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality.Maria Alvarez - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
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