In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp. 209-316 (2019)

Authors
John Turri
University of Waterloo
Abstract
Virtue epistemologists define knowledge as true belief produced by intellectual virtue. In this paper, I review how this definition fails in three important ways. First, it fails as an account of the ordinary knowledge concept, because neither belief nor reliability is essential to knowledge ordinarily understood. Second, it fails as an account of the knowledge relation itself, insofar as that relation is operationalized in the scientific study of cognition. Third, it serves no prescriptive purpose identified up till now. An alternative theory, abilism, provides a superior account of knowledge as it is ordinarily and scientifically understood. According to abilism, knowledge is an accurate representation produced by cognitive ability.
Keywords knowledge  abilism  ability  virtue epistemology  reliabilism  method  belief  science  ability  philosophical method
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability.John Turri - 2017 - In Epistemic Situationism. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 158-167.
From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.John Turri - 2015 - In Christian B. Miller, Michael R. Furr, William Fleeson & Angela Knobel (eds.), Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford: pp. 315-330.
A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism.John Turri - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Experimental, Cross-Cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology.John Turri - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):501-516.
Against Mixed Epistemology.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (2):183-195.
Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept.John Turri - 2018 - In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world: linguistic and cultural diversity and epistemology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-290.
Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
Virtue Epistemology and Environmental Luck.Masashi Kasaki - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:285-299.
Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):229 – 243.
In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.
Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.
Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.
Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge.Steven Hales - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 75:109-113.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-06-28

Total views
202 ( #53,597 of 2,462,951 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #10,068 of 2,462,951 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes