Epistemic Injustice Expanded: A Feminist, Animal Studies Approach


Abstract
In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and sex, feminist epistemology must register the animal-human dichotomy as a fundamental driving mechanism inherent in epistemic injustice. From the perspective of a truly liberatory epistemology, I thus argue for an expanded account of epistemic injustice that is both 1) sufficiently attentive to the way injustices to human knowers continue to rely on animal oppression and 2) that accommodates epistemic injustices against animal knowers
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,149
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

When Species Meet.Donna J. Haraway - 2007 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

View all 105 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.Laura Beeby - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-07-15

Total views
19 ( #492,057 of 2,289,437 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #406,937 of 2,289,437 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature