Intuitive judgments of probability are based on a limited number of heuristics that are usually effective but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Research shows, for example, that people judge the probability of a hypothesis by the degree to which it represents the evidence, with little or no regard for its prior probability. Other heuristics lead to an overestimation of the probabilities of highly available or salient events, and to overconfidence in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. These biases are not readily corrected, and they are shared by both naive and statistically sophisticated subjects. The implications of the psychology of judgment to the analysis of rational behaviour are explored
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,447
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Colorado

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Getting Fancy with Probability.Henry E. Kyburg - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):189-203.
Getting Fancy with Probability.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):189 - 203.
Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions.Robin M. Hogarth - 1975 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 70 (350):271-289.
Interpretations of Probability.Weimin Sun - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
Reasonable Doubt : Uncertainty in Education, Science and Law.Tony Gardner-Medwin - 2011 - In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy. pp. 465-483.
Creativity, Probability and Uncertainty.Matthew C. Wilson - 2009 - Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (1):45-56.
On the Psychology of Prediction.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1973 - Psychological Review 80 (4):237-251.
A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors.Marc Alpert & Howard Raiffa - 1982 - In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. pp. 294--305.
Legal Reasoning with Subjective Logic.Audun Jøsang & Viggo A. Bondi - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 8 (4):289-315.


Added to PP index

Total views
18 ( #529,830 of 2,326,369 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #433,912 of 2,326,369 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes