Ryan Tweney
Bowling Green State University
The scientific activity of Michael Faraday is examined by focusing on the procedural aspects of his activity. Procedurality is shown to be a fundamental characteristic of his work at a variety of levels: metacognitive, heuristic, schematic, and theoretical. The evolution of his ideas about the goals of science is shown to reflect fundamental roots in a procedural epistemology, closely tied to his concept of field. The implications of this analysis for the philosophy of science are briefly considered.
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