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A causal analysis of seeing
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (3):311-325 (1982)
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Citations of this work
The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
Causes need not be physically connected to their effects: The case for negative causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - In Christopher Read Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 197--216.
A counterfactual theory of prevention and 'causation' by omission.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.
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