Representationalism and the transparency of experience

Noûs 36 (1):137-51 (2002)
Abstract
Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. One very important motivation for this theory is the so-called ? transparency of experience.? The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the appeal to transparency more carefully than has been done hithertofore, to make some remarks about the introspective awareness of experience in light of this appeal, and to consider one problem case for transparency at some length, that of blurry vision. Along the way, I shall also address some of the remarks Stephen Leeds makes in his essay on transparency
Keywords Experience  Introspection  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Representation  Transparency
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0068.00365
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Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
The Significance of High-Level Content.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.

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