Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009)
This essay surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The essay is divided into five sections. Section I offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. Section II presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. Section III canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. Section IV lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections
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