Why the vague need not be higher-order vague

Mind 103 (409):43-45 (1994)
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Abstract

Is higher-order vagueness a real phenomenon? Dominic Hyde (1994) claims that it is, and that it is part and parcel of vagueness itself. According to Hyde, any genuinely vague predicate must also be higher-order vague. His argument for this view is unsound, however. The purpose of this note is to expose the fallacy, and to make some related observations on the vague, the higher-order vague, and the vaguely vague.

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‘Vague’ at Higher Orders.Ivan Hu - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1189-1216.
Qualia and vagueness.Anthony Everett - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):205-226.

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