The Evolution of the Epistemic Self: A critique of the evolutionary epistemology of Thomas Hill Green and his followers

Bradley Studies 4 (2):175-194 (1998)

Abstract

British Idealists sought to come to terms with, amongst many other things, the existence of knowledge and the development of the evolutionary and geological sciences such as they were expressed in the writings of the likes of Herbert Spencer, George Lewes and William Clifford. Different British Idealists held different attitudes to scientific evolutionary theories. Here, I shall examine the approach of the most profound member of the school — Thomas Hill Green.

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