David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 55 (1):82 - 101 (2012)
Abstract This paper outlines the proposal that narratives can back up the claim that explanations by reasons are causal explanations. While drawing for inspiration on discussions in the philosophy of history, the proposal is here discussed in the context of the classical debate about reasons and causes. The far-reaching agreement of Davidson's causalist theory with an anti-causalist argument is shown to give rise to an epistemological difficulty that is not fixed simply by attending to his understanding of singular causal claims. Elements for the outlined narrativist solution in turn can be discerned in the writings of the anti-causalist opposition and were further developed in the work of a philosopher who turned from anti-causalist to causalist about reasons?albeit not to defend the Davidsonian theory
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alasdair C. MacIntyre (2007). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre Dame Press.
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. Bradford.
A. Goldman (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
Donald Davidson (2001). Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Giuseppina D'Oro (2012). Reasons and Causes: The Philosophical Battle and The Meta-Philosophical War. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):207 - 221.
Jason Dickenson (2007). Reasons, Causes, and Contrasts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23.
Abraham S. Roth (1999). Reasons Explanations of Actions: Causal, Singular, and Situational. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):839-874.
Carl Ginet (2002). Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist Versus Noncausalist Accounts. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.
Erasmus Mayr (2011). Understanding Human Agency. Oxford University Press.
Robert D. Murray (1995). Is Davidson's Theory of Action Consistent? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):317 - 334.
Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.
Daniel D. Hutto (1999). A Cause for Concern: Reasons, Causes and Explanations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):381-401.
E. J. Lowe (2004). Locke: Compatibilist Event-Causalist or Libertarian Substance-Causalist? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):688–701.
Daniel D. Hutto (2003). Folk Psychological Narratives and the Case of Autism. Philosophical Papers 32 (3):345-361.
Mark Risjord (2005). Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Constantine Sandis (2008). Dretske on the Causation of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
K. R. Stueber (2013). The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry About Causal Deviance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):24-45.
Added to index2012-01-19
Total downloads27 ( #177,739 of 1,925,107 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #254,993 of 1,925,107 )
How can I increase my downloads?