Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and in general that global supervenience is too weak to be an interesting dependence relation. We argue that these arguments are unsound. Along the way, we clarify the relationship between global and strong supervenience, and show clearly what sort of dependence global supervenience provides.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Psychophysical Supervenience and Nonreductive Materialism.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):275-304.
Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong.Mark Moyer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.
More on Global Supervenience.Oron Shagrir - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):691 - 701.
Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities, and Anti-Individualism.Oron Shagrir - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96.
'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.Jaegwon Kim - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.
Various Concepts of “Supervenience” and Their Relations: A Comment on Kim's Theory of Supervenience.Xiaoping Chen - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):316-333.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #147,616 of 2,171,877 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,614 of 2,171,877 )
How can I increase my downloads?