Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69 (2014)
The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true
|Keywords||Is-ought Autonomy of ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic.G. Schurz - 2000 - Studia Logica 65 (3):432-434.
Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
Three Uses of the Herbrand-Gentzen Theorem in Relating Model Theory and Proof Theory.William Craig - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (3):269-285.
Citations of this work BETA
Developing a Post-Prior Taxonomy of Ethical Sentences.Patrick Clipsham - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):801-820.
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