Minding the Is-Ought Gap

Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69 (2014)
The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true
Keywords Is-ought  Autonomy of ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-012-9253-3
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References found in this work BETA
A. N. Prior (1960). The Autonomy of Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
Charles R. Pigden (1989). Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.

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