Representations in cognitive neuroscienceExplanations in terms of representations are ubiquitous in cognitive neuroscience. In this paper I will show that the question of who is using the representation is of crucial importance, but not often explicitly answered. Two possible users, the scientist and the cognitive system are theoretically strictly distinct, but the distinction is in practice often blurred. It is tempting to jump from ‘representations to the scientist’ to ‘representations to the system’. This step, however, is unwarranted. I will show that representations to the scientist are not in themselves problematic, and can even be useful, but can lead to wrong conclusions. The problems with representations for the system are more fundamental.
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DOI 10.5117/antw2019.3.006.uith
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Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.

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