Why we may not find intentions in the brain

Neuropsychologia 56:129-139 (2014)

Authors
Pim Haselager
Radboud University Nijmegen
Daniel C. Burnston
Tulane University
Abstract
Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action.We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for.
Keywords Action  Intention  Prefrontal Cortext  Motor Control
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Attention to Action and Awareness of Other Minds.Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.
“Some Remarks On Intention In Action”.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.
We-Intentions Revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Attention to Action and Awareness of Other Minds.Chris Frith - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
What Are Intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
Interpersonal Practical Reasoning.Myles Brand - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1):77-95.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-05-10

Total views
297 ( #17,387 of 2,235,452 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
73 ( #6,486 of 2,235,452 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature