Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139 (2014)
AbstractIntentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in neuroscientific explanations can easily lead to misinterpretation of the data, and can negatively influence investigation into the neural correlates of intentional action.We suggest reinterpreting the mechanisms underlying intentional action, and we will discuss the elements that such a reinterpretation needs to account for.
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References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work
Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action.Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):761-778.
Neither Mindful nor Mindless, but Minded: Habits, Ecological Psychology, and Skilled Performance.Manuel Heras-Escribano & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10109-10133.
From Commonsense to Science, and Back: The Use of Cognitive Concepts in Neuroscience.Jolien C. Francken & Marc Slors - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 29:248-258.
An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Weakness of Will.Julia Haas - 2018 - Synthese (12):1-21.
No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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