Journal of Responsible Innovation 5 (2):186-200 (2018)

Authors
Steven Umbrello
Università di Torino
Abstract
This paper argues that although moral intuitions are insufficient for making judgments on new technological innovations, they maintain great utility for informing responsible innovation. To do this, this paper employs the Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology as an illustrative example of how stakeholder values can be better distilled to inform responsible innovation. Further, it is argued that moral intuitions are necessary for determining stakeholder values required for the design of responsible technologies. This argument is supported by the claim that the moral intuitions of stakeholders allow designers to conceptualize stakeholder values and incorporate them into the early phases of design. It is concluded that design-for-values (DFV) frameworks like the VSD methodology can remain potent if developers adopt heuristic tools to diminish the influence of cognitive biases thus strengthening the reliability of moral intuitions.
Keywords design methodology  moral epistemology  design psychology  innovation  value sensitive design
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References found in this work BETA

Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design.Aimee van Wynsberghe - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (2):407-433.

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