Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism

Oxford University Press (1975)
In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.
Keywords Ignorance (Theory of knowledge  Skepticism
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Reprint years 1978, 2002
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Call number BD221.U53 2002
ISBN(s) 0198244177   9780198244172  
DOI 10.2307/2218871
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Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.

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