Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56 (2007)

Abstract
Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00121.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Tienson’s Challenge to Content Externalism.Brie Gertler - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):60-65.

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