Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56 (2007)
Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) - 1978 - Bradford Books.
Citations of this work BETA
Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker?Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.
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