Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536 (2007)

Authors
Jordi Fernandez
University of Adelaide
Abstract
In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701676419
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Transparency, Belief, Intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Knowing What I Want.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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Privileged Access Revisited.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102 - 105.
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