Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536 (2007)
In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.
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References found in this work BETA
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard A. Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Transparency, Belief, Intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
I—Alex Byrne: Transparency, Belief, Intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
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