Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613 (2007)
Abstract
Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00137.x
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perceiving Tropes.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.
Undefeated Dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.

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