Knowability and the capacity to know

Author unknown
Abstract
(PDF of penultimate draft; please don’t quote from or cite this version.) Forthcoming in Synthese. Generalizations of Fitch’s paradox of knowability motivate the thesis that in saying that a truth is knowable, or that it could be known, we do not mean that it is possible that it is known. Instead, I argue, claims about knowability express capacities to know. The paper concludes by explaining the requisite sense of “capacity” at work here, and by showing how the paradox of knowability and its generalizations are solved.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,425
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once).Greg Restall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 339--354.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
9 ( #538,373 of 2,267,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature