Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227 (2016)

Authors
Elmar Unnsteinsson
University College Dublin
Abstract
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication
Keywords reference  confusion  identity  Millikan  Grice  Frege puzzle  implicit belief
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):628-643.
A Gricean Theory of Malaprops.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):446-462.
The Edenic Theory of Reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.
Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):610-615.

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