Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227 (2016)
Authors
Elmar Unnsteinsson
University College Dublin
Abstract
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication
Keywords reference  confusion  identity  Millikan  Grice  Frege puzzle  implicit belief
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1153994
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References found in this work BETA

Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.
Quantifying In.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Gricean Theory of Malaprops.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (4):446-462.
The Edenic Theory of Reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):610-615.

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