Truthmakers, Deflationism and Weak Correspondence
A line of argument, presented by David Lewis, to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not a real alternative to deflationism is developed. It is shown that truthmakers, construed as concrete events or states of affairs, are unsatisfactory entities, since we do not know how to individuate them or how to identify their essential qualities. Furthermore, the real work is usually done by supervenience relations, which have little to do with truth. It is argued that the Equivalence Schema is quite sufficient to yield a unitary property of being true, and that this generates a weak, but non-trivial, version of the correspondence theory of truth.
|Keywords||truthmaker deflationism correspondence theory of truth event identity David Lewis supervenience pragmatist theory of truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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