Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions Under Normative Uncertainty

In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action. College Publications. pp. 1093-1104 (2016)
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Abstract

I analyze recent discussions about making moral decisions under normative uncertainty. I discuss whether this kind of uncertainty should have practical consequences for decisions and whether there are reliable methods of reasoning that deal with the possibility that we are wrong about some moral issues. I defend a limited use of the decision theory model of reasoning in cases of normative uncertainty.

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Tomasz Żuradzki
Jagiellonian University

References found in this work

Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences.Ted Lockhart - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
What to do when you don’t know what to do.Andrew Sepielli - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty.Elizabeth Harman - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.

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