This paper provides moderate criticism of so-called normative theories of thinking and reasoning. The discussion focuses on the problems of idealization, adequacy, inconsistent yet non-trivial logics, logical omniscience etc. I called them “internal” to the normative approach, because they stem from the very properties of formal systems used to model these two human activities. Some arguments, however, refer to the current theories in cognitive science, including those which are developed within “descriptive” framework.
Keywords theory  normative theories of thinking and reasoning  rational choice theory  probability  logic
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,274
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What Is So Bad About Contradictions?Graham Priest - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):410-426.
Recent Work in Epistemic Logic.Wolfgang Lenzen - 1978 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 30:1-219.
On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle.Jan Lukasiewicz & Vernon Wedin - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):485 - 509.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Clinical Reasoning: New Challenges.William E. Stempsey - 2009 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):173-179.
Norms, Goals, and the Study of Thinking.Raymond S. Nickerson - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):261-262.


Added to PP index

Total views
21 ( #513,838 of 2,448,642 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,192 of 2,448,642 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes