Narration in judiciary fact-finding: a probabilistic explication

Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (4):345-376 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be modeled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Bayesian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,596

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-02-22

Downloads
78 (#251,058)

6 months
12 (#232,423)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rafal Urbaniak
University of Gdansk

References found in this work

Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
Studies in subjective probability.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1980 - Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger. Edited by Howard Edward Smokler.

View all 33 references / Add more references