Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59 (2017)

Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argument against this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (their representational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (their representational attitudes or modes). The argument highlights the myriad liabilities and difficulties one must accrue when one tries to appeal only to what phenomenally conscious states represent in accounting for their phenomenal individuation.
Keywords representationalism  content  emotion  phenomenology  conscious experience
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DOI 10.1111/misp.12072
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References found in this work BETA

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