Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):64-67 (1942)

Abstract
This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth, in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.
Keywords W.V. Quine  truth-conditions  negation
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2017362
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