Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):167 (1988)

Uskali Mäki
University of Helsinki
Economists often seem to hold the belief that it is in the nature of a model that it cannot but be false. Once this view is adopted, any further truth talk in connection to models becomes obsolete or irrelevant. I want to resist this conclusion. I grant that a model may appear to be false in the sense that the world does not seem to be the way it is being represented in the model. In earlier work, I have entertained the idea that what appears to be false may be true after all, and I have shown some situations in which there is an obvious way of travelling from one to the other, from the appearances of falsehood to possible truth. I suggest to distinguish between two strategies of bridging this apparent gap. One is based on revising one's idea of the relevant truth bearers while sticking to some non-epistemic correspondence of truth. The other is based on revising one's conception of truth by substituting the non-epistemic conception for some epistemic conception of truth that defines truth in terms of our ways of recognizing it.
Keywords Philosophy of economics  Models  Models in Economics  Models and truth  Truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0266267100000390
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,955
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
32 ( #319,449 of 2,403,165 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #552,147 of 2,403,165 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes