Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):257-272 (2002)
AbstractTerry Horgan defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy. I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions
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