Schöningh (2014)

Authors
Konrad Utz
Universidade Federal do Ceará
Abstract
The author starts from the dilemma, diagnosed by J. Levine and others, that awareness can neither be a relation nor not be a relation. Further developing P. Strawson’s concept of “non-relational ties”, he articulates the notion of ‘sub-categorical referentiality,’ which he characterizes as centric and directional. He then argues that consciousness is constituted by a double structure of such ref-erentialities, wherein one referentiality is straight or non-self-referential and the other one is oblique by being directed towards the first one. However, these sub-categorical referentialities are not quantitatively distinct things. On the contrary, they constitute the double referentiality of one center of awareness: namely, the center of the “for me”-directedness of consciousness. Hence, this center is simultaneously self-referential and allo-referential in the referentialities that make it up, which explains the possibility and irreducibility of knowledge or awareness de se. This basic structure is then further enriched by additional referentialities until intentional consciousness is finally reached. While this latter is the normal form of our everyday consciousness, it is shown how it is not the most fundamental and thus not the only one possible. Inspired by G. Evans, the author distinguishes various forms of intentional awareness. He further distinguishes cognitive from voli-tional and intentional from intensional consciousness. In conclusion, he states that it is only on the basis of all of these referential forms together that the conscious use of language is possible.
Keywords Consciousness  Referentiality  Self-Awareness  Ego-Centeredness  Intentionality
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Reprint years 2015
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ISBN(s) 3506781235   9783506781239
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