Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):219-250 (2011)
Identity is a modally inflexible relation: two objects are necessarily identical or necessarily distinct. However, identity is not alone in this respect. We will look at the relation that one object bears to some objects if and only if it is one of them. In particular, we will consider the credentials of the thesis that no matter what some objects are, an object is necessarily one of them or necessarily not one of them
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References found in this work BETA
Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays.Robert Stalnaker - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Necessitism, Contingentism, and Plural Quantification.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):657-748.
Citations of this work BETA
Aristotelian Continua.Øystein Linnebo, Stewart Shapiro & Geoffrey Hellman - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (2):214-246.
Natural Deduction for Modal Logic with a Backtracking Operator.Jonathan Payne - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):237-258.
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