Martin Vacek
Slovak Academy of Sciences
The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures.
Keywords Modality  Possibilia  Impossibilia
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p81
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,880
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Impossibilists's Paradise on the Cheap?Martin Vacek - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu (3):283-301.
Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility.Ira Georgia Kiourti - 2010 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
Against Yagisawa's Modal Realism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):10-17.
Impossibilia and Modally Tensed Predication.Takashi Yagisawa - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):317-323.
Concrete Impossible Worlds.Martin Vacek - 2013 - Filozofia 68 (6):523-530.
Modal Realism: Yet Another Hybrid Version.Martin Vacek - 2015 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 28:3-19.
Lycan on Lewis and Meinong.Peter J. King - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:193 - 201.
Virtù e vizi del concretismo.Andrea Borghini - 2006 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 12:181-193.


Added to PP index

Total views
8 ( #956,531 of 2,426,350 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,164 of 2,426,350 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes