Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition [Book Review]

Synthese 181 (3):515-529 (2011)
Abstract
The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p . Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S ’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S , that is, it might be a feature of S ’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S , and hence, CTK is false.
Keywords Knowledge  Credit  Extended cognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0
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References found in this work BETA
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA
Belief-Forming Processes, Extended.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):741-765.
Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character.Richard Menary - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.
Extended Cognition Meets Epistemology.Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.Sarah Wright - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.
Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Knowledge and Credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.
Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge.Jason Baehr - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):1-22.

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