A dispositional analysis of propositional and doxastic justification

Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3133-3152 (2016)

Authors
Hamid Vahid
Institute for Fundamental Sciences
Abstract
An important question in epistemology concerns how the two species of justification, propositional and doxastic justification, are related to one another. According to the received view, basing one’s belief p on the grounds that provide propositional justification to believe p is sufficient for the belief to be doxastically justified. In a recent paper, however, John Turri has suggested that we should reverse the direction of explanation. In this paper, I propose to see the debate in a new light by suggesting that the best way to understand the relationship between these species of justification is by viewing propositional justification as an dispositional property that a subject can have with doxastic justification as its manifestation. I show how the debate in metaphysics over the question of how disposition statements should be analyzed runs parallel to the epistemological debate, and bring some of the results in the dispositions debate to bear on the epistemological question. I end by offering some tentative remarks regarding the order of priority of these two species of justification.
Keywords Propositional justification  Doxastic justification  Dispositions  Basing relation
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0654-y
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

The Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1887-1904.
The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification.Giacomo Melis - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):367-379.

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