Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

Hamid Vahid
Institute for Fundamental Sciences
_ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is relevant to the epistemic status of the pertinent first-order beliefs. This helps to show why a standard argument for the rationality of epistemic akrasia does not work. Finally, I shall try to show how considerations involving Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation bear on the question of the rationality of epistemic akrasia
Keywords rationality   higher-order evidence   normativity   epistemic akrasia   charity
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-05011151
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Respecting the Evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.
The Normativity of the Mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1):31-50.
Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?Jonathan Hill - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (1):31-50.

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