Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388 (2003)
Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so-called 'slow switching argument') for the thesis that externalism and self-knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument trades on an ambiguity, and that only by incorporating certain controversial assumptions does it stand a chance of establishing its conclusion. Finally, drawing on an analogy with Benacerraf's challenge to Platonism, I shall offer some reasons as to why the slow switching argument fails to reveal the real source of tension between externalism and privileged self-knowledge
|Keywords||Argument Epistemology Externalism Platonism Self-knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Citations of this work BETA
Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content.Asa Maria Wikforss - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):399-424.
The Epistemological Bases of the Slow Switching Argument.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):17-38.
The Discrimination Argument: A Reply to Dierig.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1209-1219.
Reference Failure, Illusion of Thought and Self‐Knowledge.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):303-323.
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