Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399 (2011)
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Abstract |
Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I examine and criticize a number of attempts that have sought to substantiate those assumptions. I offer some suggestions as to how one can improve on Wright's account and make some general observations about the prospects of showing that entitlement is an epistemic type of warrant
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01402.x |
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Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Entitlement and the Epistemic Status of Cornerstone Beliefs.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):126-137.
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2011-08-05
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