The Epistemology of Belief
Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Truth and the aim of belief -- Belief, interpretation, and Moore's paradox -- Belief, sensitivity, and safety -- Basic beliefs and the problem of non-doxastic justification -- Experience as reason for beliefs -- The problem of the basing relation -- Basic beliefs, easy knowledge, and the problem of warrant transfer -- Belief, justification, and fallibility -- Knowledge of our beliefs and privileged access.
|
| Keywords | Knowledge, Theory of (Religion Belief and doubt |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Buy the book | $62.95 used $78.79 new (18% off) $95.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page |
| Call number | BL51.V325 2008 |
| ISBN(s) | 9780230201460 |
| Options |
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
Self-Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.
On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs.Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.
Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.
On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total downloads
3 ( #868,150 of 2,302,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #430,710 of 2,302,520 )
2009-01-28
Total downloads
3 ( #868,150 of 2,302,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #430,710 of 2,302,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
