Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60 (2006)
Most accounts of veridical perception draw upon conventional causal theories of perception for an explanatory framework. Recently developed enactive or sensorimotor theories of perception pose a challenge to such accounts, necessitating a redefinition of veridical perception. I propose and defend one such definition, drawing upon empirical studies of perception, the resources of the enactive approach and phenomenology. I argue that perceptual experience engages an organism in a network of sensorimotor dependencies with the perceived object, and that veridical perceptions involve experiential mastery of these dependencies. A thought example involving the phoneme restoration effect is used to compare this definition favourably with traditional accounts of veridical perception that involve the generation of matching content with appropriate causal history or patterns of counterfactual dependence. I also defend my account of veridical perception against several objections
|Keywords||Epistemology Hallucination Perception Phenomenology Veridicality|
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The Pregnancy of the Real: A Phenomenological Defense of Experimental Realism.Shannon Vallor - 2009 - Inquiry 52 (1):1 – 25.
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