A theory of secondary qualities

Philosophy 55 (October):437-453 (1980)
Abstract
'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what it would be like to see 'objects themselves', We get incoherence; hence the dichotomy between this and seeing 'ideas' is also meaningless
Keywords Idea  Metaphysics  Object  Perception  Quality  Secondary Quality  Berkeley  Locke
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819100049470
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,173
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism.Emmett Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction.Steven M. Nadler - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):47-61.
Some Problems of Perceptions.Douglas Lewis - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113.
Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Return to Fundamentals.David Novitz - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.
Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities.Jonathan Bennett - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):1-17.
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):297-319.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

43 ( #117,730 of 2,152,503 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #225,818 of 2,152,503 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums