Philosophy 55 (October):437-453 (1980)
'color is not "in" objects" makes sense only if 'color "is" in objects' does. But it does not, Because we cannot say what it "would be like" if it "were". 'being green' means 'that which looks green' understood "attributively", Not referentially, I.E., 'that which looks green ("whatever that is")', Not 'that which emits certain light-Waves'. "contra" kripke, Heat is 'that which feels hot ("whatever that is")', Though the only thing whose "existence" it requires is molecular motion. If we ask what it would be like to see 'objects themselves', We get incoherence; hence the dichotomy between this and seeing 'ideas' is also meaningless
|Keywords||Idea Metaphysics Object Perception Quality Secondary Quality Berkeley Locke|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.
Similar books and articles
Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism.Emmett Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction.Steven M. Nadler - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):47-61.
Analysis Of The Problem Of Perception In British Empiricism.Justus Hartnack - 1950 - Munksgaard.
Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Return to Fundamentals.David Novitz - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.
Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities.Jonathan Bennett - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):1-17.
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):297-319.
Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction.Jennifer McKitrick - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):478-494.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #117,730 of 2,152,503 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #225,818 of 2,152,503 )
How can I increase my downloads?