Journal of Philosophical Research 16:443-445 (1991)
In his paper "Motivational Ties"[i] Al Mele addresses the question of how intentional behavior is possible in "Buridan’s ass" choice situations. This is the question of how an agent could make a choice between two or more (equally) maximally attractive options (such as choosing one, rather than another, of two effectively identical copies of a desired book). For if, as is commonly supposed, choices and intentions are based on the attractiveness of options (roughly, how strongly one is motivated to perform them), then there seems little basis for choosing, or intending, one rather than another of two or more (equally) maximally attractive options.
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