Mind 123 (489):101-127 (2014)

Authors
Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales
Abstract
Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning — most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive role in reasoning.
Keywords Reasoning  Regress  Self-Knowledge  Lewis Carroll  Moore's Paradox
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzu045
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References found in this work BETA

Moore's Paradox: One or Two?J. N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141 - 142.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
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Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
What Reasoning Might Be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).

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