Relationism and the Problem of Publicity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):645-669 (2022)
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Abstract

According to a recently developed family of relational views, whether two concepts C1 and C2 are the same is a matter of an external relation in which their tokens stand. In this paper, we highlight the chief contributions of Relationism in the elucidation of concept sameness, present a set of arguments to the effect that relational accounts of concept sameness fail to accommodate a substantive notion of concept publicity, and offer a diagnosis of this result. We conclude that the strengths of non-relational approaches will also need to be considered in order to fully capture what it means for a concept to be public.

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Author Profiles

Víctor M. Verdejo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Matheus Valente
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Samethinking.Romain Bourdoncle - 2022 - Dissertation, École Normale Supérieure

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References found in this work

Designation.Michael Devitt - 1981 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2009 - Critica 41 (123):147-162.
On concept and object.Gottlob Frege - 1951 - Mind 60 (238):168-180.

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