Mind 125 (499):895-901 (2016)

Authors
Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales
Abstract
In ‘Reasoning and Regress’ I argued that inferring a conclusion from a set of propositions may simply consist in taking it that the conclusion follows from these propositions—thereby defusing familiar regress arguments. Sinan Dogramaci challenges the generality of this view, on the grounds that sometimes you may draw conclusions from no premisses that you believe. I respond by clarifying a distinction between the premisses of an argument from the reasons your conclusion is based upon. While suppositional reasoning may involve no premisses in the former sense, it does not follow that it does not involve concluding something on the basis of reasons. This allows the view defended in ‘Reasoning and Regress’ to extend to suppositional reasoning.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzv162
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasoning and Regress.Markos Valaris - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):101-127.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasoning Without Regress.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2263-2278.
Reliable Deduction. Munaretti - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725.

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