Self-Knowledge and the Phenomenological Transparency of Belief

Philosophers' Imprint 14 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of a conscious belief makes it rational, for her, to self-ascribe that belief. I argue that an account according to which the phenomenology of belief is transparent — i.e., such that in having a conscious belief one is aware of the world as being a certain way, rather than of anything distinctively mental — is adequate to this task

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,346

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Accommodating unconscious beliefs.Luis M. Augusto - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):129-154.
Conscious belief.D. H. Mellor - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:87-101.
Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
Propositional attitudes and consciousness.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Self-quotation and self-knowledge.Rockney Jacobsen - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-17

Downloads
147 (#87,262)

6 months
6 (#133,276)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales

Citations of this work

Attitudes in Active Reasoning.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.
The verdictive organization of desire.Derek Baker - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612.
Why transparency undermines economy.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references