Philosophers' Imprint 14 (2014)
AbstractI develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of a conscious belief makes it rational, for her, to self-ascribe that belief. I argue that an account according to which the phenomenology of belief is transparent — i.e., such that in having a conscious belief one is aware of the world as being a certain way, rather than of anything distinctively mental — is adequate to this task
Similar books and articles
Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief.John N. Williams - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.
Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
Knowledge as 'True Belief Plus Individuation' in Plato.Theodore Scaltsas - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):137-149.
Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
Propositional attitudes and consciousness.Norton Nelkin - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Attitudes in Active Reasoning.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.
The verdictive organization of desire.Derek Baker - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612.
Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.
Extending the Transparency Method beyond Belief: a Solution to the Generality Problem.Adam J. Andreotta - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):191-212.
References found in this work
No references found.