Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his essay ‘Transparency, Belief, Intention’, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that transparency—our ability to form beliefs about some of our intentional mental states by considering their subject matter, rather than on the basis of special psychological evidence—involves inferring ‘from world to mind’. In this reply I argue that this cannot be correct. I articulate an intuitive necessary condition for a pattern of belief to count as a rule of inference, and I show that the pattern involved in transparency does not meet that condition. As a result, I conclude that transparency does not involve inference

Similar books and articles

Transparency and Knowledge of One's Own Perceptions.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2017 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 25:65-67.
Beliefs’ self-knowledge: an objection to the method of transparency.Javier Vidal - 2019 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 14:429-448.
The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it.Wolfgang Barz - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):916-935.
Transparency or Opacity of Mind?Martin F. Fricke - 2014 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
Transparency and Inference.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):263-268.
Transparency and Self-Knowledge, by Alex Byrne. [REVIEW]Sarah K. Paul - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):480-484.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-29

Downloads
896 (#17,620)

6 months
97 (#57,659)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
Transparency, belief, intention.Alex Byrne - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21.

View all 7 references / Add more references