The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology and evidence [Book Review]

Abstract
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
Keywords Heterophenomenology  Phenomenology  Scientific evidence  Ontology  Naturalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9092-4
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.

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