Erkenntnis 30 (3):301 - 318 (1989)
In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much stronger case can be made against the conceptual possibility of obligation dilemmas than against the conceptual possibility of prohibition dilemmas.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
The Moral Dilemmas Debate, Deontic Logic, and the Impotence of Argument.Todd Bernard Weber - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (4):459-472.
The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem. [REVIEW]De Haan Jurriaan - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.
Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality.Peter Vallentyne - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):117-124.
Moral Dilemmas, Collective Responsibility, and Moral Progress.Patricia Marino - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):203 - 225.
Constitutional Conflicts, Moral Dilemmas, and Legal Solutions.Silvina Alvarez - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (1):59-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads66 ( #79,901 of 2,171,811 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,811 )
How can I increase my downloads?