Two types of moral dilemmas

Erkenntnis 30 (3):301 - 318 (1989)
Abstract
In recent years the question of whether moral dilemmas are conceptually possible has received a fair amount of attention. In arguing for or against the conceptual possibility of moral dilemmas authors have been almost exclusively concerned with obligation dilemmas, i.e., situations in which more than one action is obligatory. Almost no one has been concerned with prohibition dilemmas, i.e., situations in which no feasible actions is permissible. I argue that the two types of dilemmas are distinct, and that a much stronger case can be made against the conceptual possibility of obligation dilemmas than against the conceptual possibility of prohibition dilemmas.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00168283
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Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.

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