Synthese 194 (6) (2017)

Authors
Markos Valaris
University of New South Wales
Abstract
The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning
Keywords Reasoning  Inference  Rule-following  John Broome   Paul Boghossian  Epistemic possibility
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1034-z
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References found in this work BETA

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Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.
Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-28.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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